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ABSTRACT
This study aims to analyze the different binational/multinational activities, programs, 
and structures taking place on the borders of Brazil and the U.S. between 2013 and 2015. A 
descriptive exploratory study of two border epidemiological surveillance (BES) systems has 
been performed. Two approaches were used to collect data: i) technical visits to the facilities 
involved with border surveillance and application of a questionnaire survey; ii) application 
of an online questionnaire survey. It was identified that, for both surveillance systems, more 
than 55% of the technicians had realized that the BES and its activities have high priority. 
Eighty percent of North American and 71% of Brazilian border jurisdictions reported an 
exchange of information between countries. Less than half of the jurisdictions reported that 
the necessary tools to carry out information exchange were available. Operational attributes 
of completeness, feedback, reciprocity, and quality of information were identified as weak or 
of low quality in both systems. Statements, guidelines, and protocols to develop surveillance 
activities are available at the U.S.-Mexico border area. The continuous systematic development 
of surveillance systems at these borders will create more effective actions and responses.
KEYWORDS: Epidemiological surveillance. Sanitary control of borders. Public health. 
Communicable diseases. Health communication.
INTRODUCTION
The epidemics of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), pandemic influenza 
(H1N1) and Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) hit the world 
with a high pathogenic potential in recent years, providing a warning to nations 
of the speed with which these epidemics can move across the globe1-3. Everyday, 
nations are more internationally connected4. On February 1, 2016, for the fourth 
time in history, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a public health 
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to make a joint global effort to control 
the outbreak caused by Zika virus (ZIKV) in Latin America and the Caribbean5,6. 
These facts reiterated the need for governments and international agencies to build 
and strengthen the surveillance of infectious diseases at all levels, from national to 
international, thus facilitating the timely detection, response, and communication 
of disease outbreaks on a global scale4.
The International Health Regulations (IHR) recommends that countries 
sharing borders and having common interests consider establishing multilateral 
agreements7. This aims to facilitate the implementation of IHR, consolidating the 
direct and rapid exchange of public health information and the application of health 
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measures at borders. This effort may prevent and/or control 
the international transmission of disease at the crossing 
point7. Land borders are physical spaces with peculiar 
characteristics including large historical, cultural, ethnic, 
economic, and social heterogeneities. In many cases, these 
spaces have intense population flows, which create special 
conditions for disease transmission8. Several studies9-14 have 
indicated that these border areas possess different dynamics 
and patterns of occurrence of disease when compared to 
other areas within countries.
Brazil and the United States of America (U.S.) are 
countries with large extensions of land borders. Brazil’s 
border is 15,719 km long and is shared with ten countries, 
all with different health policies. The border fringe occupies 
an area of 2,300,000 km2 (27.6% of the country), with 
588 municipalities and nearly 10 million people (6% of 
the population)15. The U.S. Southern border with Mexico 
extends for 3,141 km, with a fringe of 100 km (62.5 miles) 
on each side of the border and an estimated population of 
13 million people16,17.
Due to the long length of land borders, with intense 
population flows and different epidemiological and social 
scenarios, the vulnerability to the introduction and rapid 
spread of potential threats to public health is a fact that must 
be taken into consideration. Therefore, the development of 
systems and activities focusing on border epidemiological 
surveillance (BES) is essential both for domestic and global 
health security18. Based on the hypothesis that border 
surveillances must promote binational communication, 
an exchange of epidemiologic information in a timely and 
dynamic manner to improve the cross-border public health 
infrastructure through collaboration, this study aimed to 
analyze the different binational/multinational activities, 
programs, and structures to identify challenges and to 
suggest improvements of binational and/or multinational 
epidemiological surveillance partnerships on the borders 
of Brazil and the U.S.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
A descriptive exploratory study about border 
epidemiological surveillance (BES) systems was performed 
in South and North America between 2013 and 2015. A total 
of 47 interviews at every operational level of the BES were 
conducted at the United States-Mexico border (US-MX 
border applied from February 2014 to September 2014) 
and Brazil (November 2014 to March 2015). 
Description of the study area
In South America, the study focused on the border 
between Brazil and the America’s Southern Cone countries 
(Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay). This border area is 
defined as the area of land situated 150 km North and South 
from the International Boundary Line. This region is divided 
into six subregions (XII-XVII) with 441 municipalities, 
an area of 329,943 km2 and a population of 6,893,804 
inhabitants19 (Figure 1).
As for North America, the study was carried out on the 
Southern U.S. border with Mexico. This border has a length 
of approximately 3,141 km. The border region is defined 
as the area of land situated 100 km (62.5 miles) North and 
South from the international boundary. The area includes 
four U.S. States (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Texas) and six Mexican States (Baja California, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas) with 
an estimated population of about 13 million people17 
(Figure 2).
Figure 1 - Map -illustrating the border regions between Brazil and the Mercosur member countries. Source: Peiter15
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Data collection and analysis
BES operational data were collected using a developed 
semi-structured questionnaire with a focus on information 
exchange between jurisdictions, domestically and 
internationally. The instrument was based on previous 
surveys by the CDC20, Bruniera-Oliveira et al.21 and 
Varan et al.22 and was structured with four dimensions: 
organizational priorities and resources, information 
exchange, laboratory, and challenges.
Because of long geographical distances, two approaches 
were used for data collection: i) technical visits to the 
facilities involved with border surveillance, which included 
questionnaire applications and direct observations of the 
operational procedures and facility structures; ii) application 
of online questionnaires for those facilities that could not be 
visited. For both approaches, questionnaires were developed 
in English and, subsequently, translated into Spanish and 
Portuguese.
A draft questionnaire was shared with stakeholders 
in all operational levels working directly or indirectly on 
border surveillance activities in the U.S. for comments and 
suggestions. A pilot test of a final version of the tool was 
conducted with U.S. and Mexico stakeholders to evaluate 
its effectiveness to collect information. A Likert scale was 
used to measure the outcomes23-25. The final version of the 
English questionnaire was translated and back-translated 
by native speakers of Spanish and Portuguese, which 
subsequently went through the same validation process by 
experts. For the questionnaire application by digital media, 
an online survey development software, SurveyMonkey, 
was used (Research SurveyMonkey®). Its distribution and 
monitoring were done through links distributed by e-mail 
to the participants’ e-mails.
Technical visits were carried out at agencies, institutions 
and partners (such as health surveillance agencies, 
immigration departments, national or multinational 
committees/groups, laboratories, etc.), proceeding 
with document analysis, organization observation, and 
operational structure and involvement of professionals 
with surveillance activities. During the visits, interviews 
were conducted with BES stakeholders in their various 
operational levels using the questionnaire that had been 
developed. In the absence of the technician in charge 
in the facilities visited or in areas where visit was not 
possible, the stakeholders were invited to answer the online 
questionnaire.
When a respondent had questions about the questionnaire 
or the researcher had questions about responses, a phone 
interview or web conference was conducted. The scope of 
the questionnaire included some operational attributes of 
surveillance, such as completeness, reciprocity, opportunity, 
feedback, and the quality of information. These attributes 
were analyzed from the perspective of the respondents 
using the Likert scale for measurement. This research was 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the National 
School of Public Health Sergio Arouca (CEP / ENSP), under 
the Nº 699.241.
RESULTS
Operational profile of the respondents
A total of 47 stakeholders were interviewed. Thirty of 
Figure 2 - US-Mexico border. Source: http://www.borderhealth.org/border_region.php
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these technicians were from the North-American BES (20 
technicians from the U.S. and 10 from Mexico), while in 
South America all the 17 technicians were from Brazil. The 
majority of respondents in Brazil and half in the United 
States belonged to the local health municipalities, whereas 
the State level in Mexico was the most frequent in the 
interviews (Table 1).
Operational characteristics of the systems
The U.S. has developed programs and specialized 
structures in border surveillance, such as the Borders Office, 
quarantine stations (QS), and important partnerships with 
several agencies that provide support with any suspected 
case of an important binational disease (Table 1). Brazil 
does not have such structures. However, it does have 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and border offices 
in its structural organization, and organization stations 
called the Health Surveillance Stations of Ports, Airports, 
Borders and Customs Enclosures (PVPAF) of the Brazilian 
Sanitary Surveillance Agency (ANVISA). These stations 
are located at strategic points in Brazil, 17 of which are on 
land borders. Surveillance activities and sanitary control of 
goods, people, and animals are carried out at these stations, 
and some facilities have agreements with regional hospitals 
for the displacement and isolation of suspected cases of 
infectious diseases of public health concern. In addition, 
some of these stations are located on borders that have bi- 
or multinational facilities, a fact that makes the interaction 
between countries easier and more timely (Table 1).
In both surveillance systems, more than 55% of the 
technicians at several operational levels realize that the 
BES and their activities (detection, investigation, and 
binational or multinational notification) are high priority. 
Nevertheless, for these technicians, the nonexistence and/
or availability of a formal protocol with the neighboring 
country is considered a limiting factor for the development 
of appropriate actions. Only 38% of respondents in South 
America are familiar with the contact points involved in the 
notification and binational investigation. This proportion 
increases to 55% on the U.S.-Mexico border where there are 
available statements, guidelines, and protocols to develop 
joint activities in the border areas (Table 2). A specific 
document, the “U.S. Mexico Binational Communication 
Pathways Protocol,” for the land border deserves to be 
highlighted. This document has been improved since 2002 
by several technicians at several operational levels of the 
two countries and proposes to systematize and enhance the 
exchange of information mechanisms26.
Information exchange between countries occurs in 
more than 80% of North American jurisdictions and 71% 
percent of the Brazilian jurisdictions; however, only the U.S. 
and Mexico’s technicians consider this exchange timely. 
Brazilian and U.S. technicians identified the reciprocity of 
Table 1 - Profile of the respondents, geographic and operational characteristics of the Borders Epidemiological Surveillance System
US-Mexico Border Brazilian Border
U.S Mexico Brazil
Profile of the respondents
Number of respondents 20 10 17
Operational Level of Respondents Federal 4 - 4
State 6 6 3
Local 6 3 8
Laboratories 4 1 2
Geographic characteristics
Border Extension 3.141,0 3.694,8
Number of Countries Bordering 1 03
Twin Cities 34 21
Population 12.000.000 6.186.840
Points of Entry 43 numerous
Operational characteristics
Presence of Quarantine Station Yes No
Border Offices Yes No
Border Type (open or closed) Closed Open
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sending information as a failure. The feedback and follow-
up of epidemiological information was considered low by 
all stakeholders.
The quality and completeness of exchanged information 
were considered medium to weak in the scale used. Less 
than half of the jurisdictions have the necessary tools to 
carry out information exchange. Telephone and electronic 
means of communication, such as e-mail, are most 
commonly used for information exchange. Over 50% of 
respondents reported a lack of mechanisms for sharing 
personally identifiable information (PII), such as encrypted 
e-mails (Table 2).
Organizational priorities
In both investigated systems, the priorities and actions 
are defined in binational meetings involving various 
partners. In South America, the Comitê Interfronteiriço 
and the Grupo Técnico de Itaipu Saúde are important 
mechanisms to outline surveillance activities. On the 
U.S.-MX border, groups and meetings, such as the 
Binational Joint Operational Meeting, the Epi Meeting, 
the Border Epidemiology and Surveillance Team (BEST) 
meeting, as well as the Consejo Binacional de Salud, among 
others, are important mechanisms used to share data to 
collaborate. It should be stressed that, in South America, 
there was no evidence of participation of organizations, 
such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 
MERCOSUR, or the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) in any local border activities. The U.S.-MX 
border used to have a PAHO’s border office in El Paso, 
which acted as facilitator of the collaboration between the 
U. S. and Mexico. However, this office ceased its activities 
in 2014.
Table 2 - Organizational priorities, information exchange and Binational Notification of the Borders Epidemiological Surveillance 
System
US-Mexico Border Brazilian Border
U.S Mexico Brazil
Organizational priorities
Border surveillance is recognized as a 
priority for
Federal 55% 78% 62%
State 55% 78% 44%
Local 65% 78% 77%
Binational notification is recognized as High High
Information exchange and Binational Notification 
Availability of Protocol 45% 33% 29%
Clarity and Well defined of the pathways for communication be-
tween binational public health agencies 40% 22% 10%
Familiarity with the contact points involved with the binational 
notification 55% 56% 38%
Occurrence of binational exchange of epidemiologic information 80% 90% 71%
Timeliness of epidemiological information sharing Always Always Never
Reciprocity of epidemiological information 25% 33% 40%
 Feedback and Follow-up of the information Low Low Low
Completeness of the epidemiological information Poor-Fair Poor-Fair Poor-Fair
Quality of the epidemiological information Poor-Fair Poor-Fair Poor-Fair
Availability of necessary tools to carry out the exchange of bina-




Electronic web system communications 42% 71% 50%
Telephone 14% 71% 50%
Fax 29% 15% 50%
There are no mechanisms of binational 
communication 15% 42% 50%
Established mechanisms for sharing personally identifiable in-
formation (PII) 40% 22% 29%
Bruniera-Oliveira et al.
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Human, financial resources and inputs
The limited availability of funds and specific resources 
is a major obstacle in the development of BES in Brazil 
and Mexico. Eighty percent of U.S. respondents reported 
the availability of financial and human resources from the 
three operational levels of administration. The training 
for technicians, including laboratory workers, is present 
in both systems. The respondents in the two surveyed 
areas consider that the U.S. and Brazil (for having more 
economic and financial capacity) should provide more 
support to the activities of their neighboring countries. 
Differences between countries make the border actions 
being implemented often only on the U.S. or Brazilian 
side (Table 3).
Laboratories
In the U.S.-MX border review, local laboratories mainly 
process samples of cases under investigation. In Brazil, 
an emphasis should be given to the Border Laboratories’ 
Network, coordinated by the Brazilian Health Surveillance 
Secretariat (SVS/MS), which consists of 12 laboratories 
located along the Brazilian border (Figure 3). This network 
was created to develop the capacity and opportunity for 
detection of major communicable diseases, lowering 
the demands on the Central Laboratory of Public Health 
(LACEN).
Regarding the laboratory support to BES, some 
similarities between the two areas’ borders were identified. 
Diagnostic and quality control panels testing methods are 
standardized and harmonized among laboratories within 
the countries, but it is not standardized among counterpart 
laboratories. Technology and cooperation exchange was 
observed between countries, but at a low frequency. 
Respondents believe that the financial resources and 
inputs are not sufficient to conduct all laboratory activities. 
However, on the Brazilian side, those technicians believed 
that they had the sufficient number of technicians to respond 
to all the demands of their laboratories - a fact not observed 
in U.S. and Mexican laboratories. The low frequency of 
training was cited as a major obstacle. Documents that 
Table 3 - Human, financial and technical support, Laboratory and Challenges of the Borders Epidemiological Surveillance System
US-Mexico Border Brazilian Border
Human, Financial Resources and technical support.
U.S Mexico Brazil
Availability of resources in your country specifically 
allocated to carry out the binational surveillance 
activities
80% 22% 11%
Technician’s training Present Present Present
Support (personnel, technical and financial support) 








Your country (between 
jurisdictions)
52% 78% 87%
With your neighboring 
Country
55% - 16%
Collaboration, support and / or exchange of tech-
nology
Present Present Present
The financial resources available is sufficient to carry 
out laboratory activities
35% 44% 43%
The human resources available is sufficient to carry 
out the laboratory activities
35% 44% 60%
Cross border laboratory training occur at least once 
a year
52% 75% 20%
Availability document which regulates how it should 
operate the flow of information and samples
Absent Absent Absent
Challenges
Language as a barrier for binational surveillance Important Moderately important Of little importance
Differences in health systems between Differences hinder a lot Moderate problem Minor problem
Rev Inst Med Trop São Paulo. 2017;59:e68
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regulate the flow of information and samples of binational 
cases in the two borders were not identified (Table 3).
Main challenges identified by respondents
Although the countries involved in this study have 
different health organization systems and speak different 
languages, few technicians identified these differences as 
barriers to develop BES activities. In general, the major 
obstacle highlighted to the exchange of information and 
joint activities was the lack of guidelines describing the 
steps of binational disease notification and investigation 
(Table 3).
DISCUSSION
Acknowledging the vulnerability of introducing and 
spreading potential public health events through land 
borders, the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
recommends that countries sharing common borders 
should consider establishing bilateral or multilateral 
agreements about strengthening surveillance actions at 
ground crossings7.
In larger border areas, such as those of the U.S. and 
Brazil, there are large numbers of residents. Together 
with the intense population flow, this provides a favorable 
scenario for the occurrence and spread of communicable and 
noncommunicable diseases8,27. Ferraz et al.28 and Spradling 
et al.29 pointed toward different profiles of tuberculosis and 
acute viral hepatitis in the border regions of Brazil and the 
United States, respectively, when compared with States 
and national rates. Thus, the inclusion and prioritization of 
BES activities, mainly at the local and federal levels, are an 
important step toward consolidation of health surveillance 
systems reflecting the recognition of the importance of the 
issue by the governments.
However, as observed in this study (particularly 
in South America), findings show that it lacks certain 
protocols. These protocols, as observed at the U.S.-MX 
border, define the actions and communication flows 
between public health agencies involved with binational 
notifications and may support adequate responses to the 
occurrence of public health events. Wang et al.30, studying 
vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) outbreaks, noted that 
surveillance based on solid international collaboration and 
agreements with clear and well-defined paths allows for an 
exchange of information in a timely and dynamic manner. 
The contribution of such agreements was critical to avoid 
the VDPV outbreaks from reaching China through its land 
borders. The inadequacy of many surveillance indicators 
(lack of opportunity for the exchange of epidemiological 
information, quality of the epidemiological information, 
reciprocity, feedback, and incompleteness of information) 
may be related to the informality of the BES operational 
articulation.
BES systems in North and South America have taken 
important steps toward systematizing their activities. 
Both international borders are defining their priorities and 
actions in these regions together with stakeholders and 
partners of the neighboring countries. North American 
countries have developed and distributed a document 
detailing the step-by-step operational flow of information 
and actions because these countries place a higher priority 
on their actions. BES services that have developed and 
implemented such protocols and plans result in more 
clear and efficient conduction, evaluation, and review of 
operational procedures. In addition, the activities are not 
linked to specific individuals, but are rather institutionalized, 
allowing the continuity of standard procedures and 
minimizing disruptions to required actions.
A lack of human, technical, and financial resources 
were major obstacles in Brazil and Mexico. Scarcity of 
primarily financial resources to hire technicians weakens 
the systems of these two countries. The lack of technicians 
and high personnel turnover at the jurisdiction level creates 
a burden on the technical staff, affecting the necessary 
epidemiological actions. In this respect, Bruniera-Oliveira 
et al.21 evaluated Brazil’s rotavirus epidemiological 
surveillance, noting that the limited number of technicalities 
and high turnover caused a delay in the process, transfer 
and response of the rotavirus surveillance.
The need for a greater investment in human, technical, 
and financial resources was unanimous by respondents in 
both of the studied areas. It is possible that many of the 
process difficulties, particularly information exchange, 
are due to structural differences between the countries 
involved. While, in Brazil there is a system that facilitates 
mechanisms to carry out information exchange quickly and 
confidentially, other countries are using unsafe means for 
information exchange. This structural discrepancy generates 
resistance, especially when health services are dealing with 
personal information. Furthermore, there are mechanism 
incompatibilities, such as differences in software versions 
used or even lack of such mechanisms. Therefore, countries 
with available resources should seek ways to standardize 
communication mechanisms26.
Particular attention should be given to laboratories, 
which provide support for border surveillance. For most of 
the infectious diseases of public health concern, laboratory 
confirmation is essential for planning and triggering the 
control and prevention actions. Thus, the organization 
of a laboratory network able to meet demands of the 
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border areas would increase sensitivity, opportunity, and 
system specificity31. In North America, due to the systems 
developed at the borders, such as the Border Infectious 
Disease Surveillance (BIDS), there was a substantial 
reduction in disparities with surveillance capabilities in 
incompatibility of used case definitions. This resulted in 
increased diagnostic capacity and laboratory capability in 
the region9.
In Brazil, the Border Laboratories Network can be 
considered innovative as it seeks to reduce the differences 
in laboratory capacity between countries. However, despite 
what has been developed so far, significant obstacles 
were identified, such as a lack of support from federal 
laboratories and no standardization of techniques among 
countries. This hindered comparisons and the planning of 
binational actions. A study about the occurrence of public 
health emergencies in Brazil proved that, in the border 
areas, laboratory confirmation remains low for suspected 
cases21. This lack of diagnosis can be attributed to the high 
testing demand that these laboratories have, which requires 
additional investment for its expansion and an increase of 
capacity to become a robust border network. Although one 
of the response pillars to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa 
has been the laboratory support, the lack of capacity during 
the early stages of the epidemic was undoubtedly a factor 
that contributed to Ebola’s rapid expansion, reinforcing the 
idea of consolidating a prepared network to respond to any 
type of threat32,33. Such difficulties in the BES development, 
including laboratory services, may have contributed to a 
weak capacity to detect and respond in a timely manner 
to public health events, as observed for the Brazilian 
international border municipalities34. The analysis of their 
capacity to report infectious diseases with a potential to 
generate an epidemic demonstrated a very low proportion 
(16,6%) of cases of these diseases being reported in a timely 
manner (< 24 hours - as established nationally).
The political organization of different countries for the 
entry and movement of people through borders are relevant 
factors in the comparison of surveillance systems and in the 
design of health systems for the border regions. The Treaty 
of Asunción, which gave rise to MERCOSUR, establishes 
that the States’ parties have the freedom of movement 
for people, goods, and services among them35. Hence, 
the Brazilian Southern Border Arc has an extremely high 
daily porosity for people entry and exit, once the crossing 
between countries can be taken without any impediment. 
As evidenced by the research, there are numerous points 
of entry, where there are no checkpoints, such as health 
inspection points or customs. On the other hand, in North 
America, in addition to the physical barriers along the 
border, all entry points are controlled by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP). This agency first screens 
incoming international travelers with the CDC and has 
the power to detain for the enforcement of isolation and 
quarantine of individuals with any signs and/or symptoms 
of infectious diseases36. The presence of such agencies 
as the CBP plays an important role in the containment of 
infectious diseases entering the United States. Countries 
that applied travel restrictions on their borders during the 
epidemic of the influenza virus A (H1N1) observed that 
both the restriction and the isolation and quarantine of the 
cases played an important contribution in the delay of the 
virus in their countries37,38.
The lack of a screening process at the border crossing 
points temporarily makes the detection of potential suspect 
cases very passive, dependent on volunteers seeking health 
assistance. The receiving health facility of a suspected case 
must be prepared to provide the initial care to isolate the case 
when necessary or make the transport to the place of isolation. 
They must then communicate in a timely manner with the 
respective authorities in the neighboring country to begin the 
binational investigation. Moreover, all health facilities in the 
border region, including laboratories, must be notified about 
the possible suspect cases. An online system for binational 
notification would be the tool of choice. All levels involved 
in the response could then input, search, and follow up in 
real time on all the epidemiological information of cases, 
thus creating increased transparency and dynamism to the 
response process. Inside this network, an important movement 
should be made to bring international organizations closer, 
such as PAHO and multilateral mechanisms, as MERCOSUR 
and UNASUR. These structures and mechanisms should have 
important tools that have been created for international health 
dialogue so they can act as front ambassadors to stalemates 
when an urgent international response is required. Forums 
and mechanisms created by these agencies are important 
health authorities of the participating countries. Due to 
the previous meetings, they already have affinities, which 
facilitate and streamline the dialogue and target the most 
controversial issues.
One of the limitations of this study was the voluntary 
participation, which made some of the invited stakeholders/
key coordinators not available to answer the survey. Another 
limitation was the financial aspect, which restricted the 
field visit to just one point of entry into South America. 
Specifically, in the South Arc, obtaining responses 
from Paraguayan technicians would have enhanced and 
contributed much to the technical discussion. However, 
despite numerous contacts and invitations, this did not 
materialize. This limitation has highlighted the lack of 
multinational mechanisms that could facilitate and would 
promote dialogue with BES structures.
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Taking from the results observed in this study, 
the following concluding points can be highlighted: 
i) availability of a protocol to North American borders; 
international borders are defining their priorities and 
actions at these regions together with stakeholders and 
partners from neighboring countries and the existence 
of border laboratories; ii) because this is a study, among 
the few, focused on border epidemiological surveillance 
in the Americas’ Southern Cone countries, this research 
has raised questions about borders that require special 
attention to delineate and help the flow of work processes; 
iii) the continuous, systematic development of surveillance 
systems at the borders will provide more effectiveness 
to the implementation of actions and responses; thus, 
countries can improve their mechanisms to respond in 
future outbreaks; iv) considering the external validity of 
this study, the results achieved do not necessarily apply to 
the reality of other borders; however, the instrument used 
in this research can be adapted to be used in studies that 
deal with border surveillance in other parts of the world.
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